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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2015 was a busy year for the Antitrust Division (Division)
of the U.S. Department of Justice (Department)—we opened a number of
investigations, logged a lot of trial time, and recorded several victories of
note, all of which I will quickly highlight in a moment.
* Renata B. Hesse is Acting Head of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. The
following article are remarks as prepared for the Global Competition Review at the 5th Annual
Antitrust Law Leaders Forum on February 5, 2016 in Miami, Florida. Ms. Hesse would like to
thank her colleague Anant Raut, Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, for his help in
preparing these remarks.
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But while these actions give you a snapshot of what we do on a dayto-day basis, they don’t fully capture our role in helping drive innovation.
What I want to discuss first is how all of that work that we do maintaining
competitive markets intersects with an economy that is constantly
changing. Today, there are many companies, and even industries, that
did not exist eighteen months ago. We should be asking ourselves: how
do we balance a strong enforcement agenda with promoting growth and
innovation in the economy? The answer, I think, is twofold. The first part
of the answer is something that we all tend to take for granted, but should
not: it is precisely because we do our jobs, and do them in a legal system
that is transparent and (as much as we can make it) predictable, that
innovators and entrepreneurs feel comfortable investing resources to
develop new products. The promise that you will be able to compete and,
most importantly, win, if you build something that consumers want, is
something American businesses rely on every day. But a second, perhaps
equally important part of that answer is that our system demands that we
maintain flexibility. Our analyses of these industries must keep up with
the changes occurring. By faithfully doing so, antitrust will continue to
ensure that innovation and entrepreneurs operate in an environment
where it is a foregone conclusion that they have the ability to succeed.
II. 2015 HIGHLIGHTS
In 2015, the Division took action to prevent several potential
transactions that we believed would ultimately have been bad for
consumers. After several weeks of trial in November, General Electric
abandoned the $3.3 billion sale of its appliances business to Electrolux,1
and two theater advertising networks, National CineMedia and
Screenvision, abandoned what would have ultimately been a merger to
monopoly after the Division filed suit.2
Comcast and Time Warner Cable dropped their proposed merger after
the Division expressed concerns about the effect the deal would have had
on the ability of a variety of content providers to reach customers in their
homes.3 Parties in two other large mergers, Applied Materials and Tokyo
1

Ted Mann & Jens Hansegard, GE Terminates Sale of Appliances Business to Electrolux, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-terminates-sale-of-appliance-business-toelectrolux-1449474391.
2 Jeff Bliss et al., MLEX IN WASHINGTON: Report from the 63rd ABA Antitrust Law Spring
Meeting, MLEX MARKET INSIGHT 57 (Apr. 2015), http://mlexmarketinsight.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/MLex-ABA-Coverage-Book-20153.pdf.
3 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Comcast Corporation Abandons Proposed Acquisition of
Time Warner Cable After Justice Department and the Federal Communications Commission
Informed Parties of Concerns, (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/comcastcorporation-abandons-proposed-acquisition-time-warner-cable-after-justice-department.
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Electron, and Chicken of the Sea and Bumble Bee, abandoned their deals
after the Division expressed concerns that those deals would reduce
competition in the markets for semiconductor manufacturing equipment4
and canned tuna5, respectively.
We achieved some notable courtroom victories in civil non-merger
matters as well. Last February, Judge Garaufis of the Eastern District of
New York ruled in favor of the Division after we sued American Express
for anti-steering contract terms that prevented merchants from benefiting
from price competition in the market for merchant swipe fees. 6 Later, in
June, the Second Circuit upheld the Division’s 2013 victory in the ebooks case, in which the Division established that Apple, Inc., and five
of the six major book publishers entered into an illegal agreement
designed to raise e-book prices.7
The Division’s criminal lawyers were also busy last year, obtaining
pleas, guilty verdicts, and significant criminal penalties. We obtained
over $2.5 billion in criminal fines from major banks that pled guilty to
conspiring to manipulate the price of U.S. dollars and euros exchanged
in the foreign currency (FX) exchange spot market.8
We also unsealed an indictment against an online poster company and
its owner for fixing the price of posters sold through Amazon
Marketplace.9 What’s notable here is that this was the Division’s first
criminal prosecution against a conspiracy specifically targeting ecommerce.10
Our ongoing investigation into bid rigging involving automotive parts
sold in the United States has so far yielded charges against 58 individuals
and 38 companies, and over $2.6 billion in fines.11 Our continuing
4

Press Release, Applied Materials, Applied Materials, Inc. and Toyko Electron Limited Agree to
Terminate
Business
Combination
Agreement,
(Apr.
26,
2015),
http://www.appliedmaterials.com/company/news/press-releases/2015/04/applied-materials-incand-tokyo-electron-limited-agree-to-terminate-business-combination-agreement.
5 Brent Kendall, Tuna Leaders Call Off Deal on Antitrust Concerns, Wᴀʟʟ Sᴛ. J. (Dec. 4th, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/tuna-leaders-call-off-acquisition-deal-on-antitrust-concerns1449205448.
6 United States v. Am. Exp. Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 238 (E.D. N.Y. 2015).
7 United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 339 (2d Cir. 2015).
8 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas,
(May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guiltypleas.
9 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, E-Commerce Exec and Online Retailer Charged with Price
Fixing Wall Posters, (Dec. 4th, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/e-commerce-exec-andonline-retailer-charged-price-fixing-wall-posters.
10 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former E-Commerce Executive Charged with Price Fixing
in the Antitrust Division’s First Online Marketplace Prosecution, (Apr. 6th, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-e-commerce-executive-charged-price-fixing-antitrustdivisions-first-online-marketplace.
11 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, INOAC Corp. to Pay $2.35 Million for Fixing Prices on
Auto Parts, (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/inoac-corp-pay-235-million-fixing-
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investigation into collusion among ocean shipping lines in international
ocean shipping services has resulted in 3 companies pleading guilty and
collectively paying $136 million in fines, and, at the individual level,
charges against 7 executives.12 The indictments in both of the
investigations demonstrated our continued effort to hold individual, not
just corporate, conspirators accountable for their criminal actions.
We are also continuing to prosecute bid rigging and frauds at real
estate foreclosure auctions across the country. Through these schemes,
real estate investors have tried to keep for themselves money that should
have gone to the mortgage holders or, in some cases, the homeowners
who suffered through foreclosure. So far, the Division has charged more
than 100 investors in northern California and across the southeastern
United States.13 Most have pled guilty; we will be going to trial against
the rest of them in the coming year.
III. FOSTERING CHANGE
I want to turn now to the focus of my remarks, which is about the role
of antitrust in advancing the innovation economy. I would like to start
with an anecdote.
There was a post circulating on social media a couple of years ago,
with the headline, “Everything From This 1991 Radio Shack Ad You Can
Now Do With Your Phone.”14 It advertised both a “mobile cellular
telephone”15 as well as a handset phone with “20-Memory Speed-Dial.”16
By way of comparison, I have 100+ contacts in my cell phone, which I
can voice activate. It advertised a “handheld voice-actuated cassette tape
recorder” and an answering machine,17 which have now been supplanted
by voice memos and voicemail, respectively. It advertised a calculator
and an alarm clock18, which are native apps on most cell phones now. It
advertised a “Deluxe Portable CD Player,” which plays one CD at a
prices-auto-parts.
12 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Ocean Shipping Executives Indicted for Fixing
Prices and Rigging Bids, (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-ocean-shippingexecutives-indicted-fixing-prices-and-rigging-bids.
13 E.g., United States Department of Justice, Two Georgia Real Estate Investors Plead Guilty to
Rigging
Bids
at
Public
Home
Foreclosure
Auctions,
(Jan.
4,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-georgia-real-estate-investors-plead-guilty-rigging-bidspublic-home-foreclosure-auctions.
14 Steve Cichon, Everything from this 1991 Radio Shack Ad You Can Now Do with Your Phone,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-cichon/radio-shackad_b_4612973.html.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
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time.19 Meanwhile, I have tens of albums and hundreds of songs on my
phone itself, and more than I have time to listen to through various
streaming services.
The ad also featured a “VHS Camcorder.”20 I now regularly send short
cellphone videos of my children to my family, all over text or email. Also
in the ad is my personal favorite: a $1600 Tandy desktop computer with
a 20MB hard drive.21 My cell phone has 64GB.
A bonus observation by the author of the post: across the bottom, the
advertisement urges you to, quote, “Check Your Phone Book for the
Radio Store or Dealer Nearest You.”22 I think it is fair to say that not a
lot of people use a phone book for that anymore; between search engines
and increasingly sophisticated mapping apps, the whole world, and its
accumulated knowledge, is at our fingertips. In just the last decade alone,
a combination of innovations, including the introduction of the
smartphone and advances in wireless technology, has led to the
retirement of some industries, the evolution of others, and the creation of
even more. Faster and more powerful chip technology has given rise to
innovations as varied as wearable tech, such as a workout shirt that tracks
your heart rate,23 and near field communication, allowing grocery stores
to print coupons for you as you walk past.24
A side note—I had been planning to use the intro to “The Jetsons” as
my example of how close we are to realizing our vision of the future,
when I realized that one of the key features of it will probably start to feel
dated within the next few years: the fact that George Jetson is still driving
his own car.
We are living in an amazing time in history for innovation, but
innovation does not happen in a vacuum. It requires ingenuity, hard work,
and access to capital. To thrive, it must be buttressed by a legal system
that is both transparent and accessible; that has a clearly articulated
framework of laws, and published precedents that help to guide those
seeking to understand the meaning of those laws and apply them; and
oversight by an independent judiciary, where decisions are reached
through rigorous advocacy based upon facts, law, and economics. Is the
system perfect? No, but win or lose, those who take part in the system
have the assurance that the system will treat them fairly.
So where does antitrust enforcement factor into the calculation? Our
19

Id.
Steve Cichon, supra note 14.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See generally Azalea Pena, Your Next Ralph Lauren Shirt Will Measure Heart Rate and
Calories Burned, PSFK (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.psfk.com/2015/08/ralph-lauren-smart-shirtpolotech-shirt-app.html.
24 See generally Lex Friedman, Grocery Pal for iPhone, MACWORLD (Feb. 19, 2010 2:30 PM),
http://www.macworld.com/article/1146551/grocerypal.html.
20
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impact is through equal parts what we do and what we refrain from doing.
IV. REWARDING INNOVATION
A central tenet of modern antitrust is to protect the competitive
process, because competition generates innovation. Competition inspires
people to try to make the next great thing. However in order to keep the
cycle working, you must encourage (even celebrate) the ability of
creators to reap the rewards of their efforts, provided they do so lawfully.
Under U.S. antitrust law, we do not punish lawful monopolies. When
monopoly profits flow to an entrepreneur because she has made a better
product or developed a better service, society still benefits from the
competition that produced that better product or service, and the profits
that the entrepreneur makes reflect the value that society places on her
innovation. Now, contrast that situation with one in which monopoly
profits are obtained through the acquisition of a competitor, taking it out
of the market. This elimination of competition is a loss for society, which
is why a large component of our mission is to prevent these harmful
transactions from going forward.
In United States v. Grinnell Corporation, the Supreme Court held that
a necessary element of an unlawful monopoly under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act is the willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly
power in the relevant market that is distinct from “growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”25 In other words, the antitrust laws do not penalize you simply
because your product or service is so great or innovative that the majority
of the market wants to buy it. Think of the dampening effect that would
have on innovation in this country. To put it into modern parlance, we
would not expect entrepreneurs to continue working out of their garages
for three years, eating two packs of ramen a day, if, in their minds, the
success of that next must-have technology they have been building is
going to be capped were it to become “too” popular.
On the other hand, we will enforce the antitrust laws against
successful innovators if they abuse their positions and try to hobble or
exclude rivals. If you go back through and take a closer look at some of
the monopolization cases the Division has brought in the last two
decades, you will see that our focus was not so much on the party’s
monopoly power as the actions it was taking in order to maintain that
market dominance. Consider the Microsoft case that the Division brought
in the late ‘90s.26 As you may recall, Microsoft controlled nearly 90% of
25

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571–72 (1966).
Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp, No. 98-1232 (D.D.C., May 18, 1998), available
at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/08/09/1763.pdf.
26
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the PC operating system market through Windows OS.27 Microsoft
Explorer also commanded a large share of the burgeoning internet
browser market.28 These monopolies by themselves were not a violation
of the antitrust laws. The conduct we challenged was how Microsoft
attempted to protect its dominant share of the operating system market by
entering into exclusive (or near-exclusive) agreements with ISPs and
OEMs and by designing Windows in a way that discouraged the
development of rival platforms.29
A decade later, the Division brought a Section 2 case against United
Regional Health Care System for attempting to maintain its market share
by penalizing insurers that contracted with its competitors.30 At that time,
United Regional controlled nearly 90% of inpatient hospital services and
65% of outpatient surgical services in the Wichita Falls, Texas market,
and was the only provider of certain essential services in that market,
making it a “must-have” as part of a provider network.31 The behavior we
challenged was United Regional’s imposition of restrictive contract
conditions on any of its insurers that tried to contract with one of United
Regional’s competitors.32 Specifically, insurers that included United
Regional’s competitors in their networks would have faced steep
reductions in their discounts off of United Regional’s billed charges,
prohibitively raising the insurers’ effective rates.33 These pricing
practices kept competitors out the Wichita Falls market.34 As a result,
consumers could not receive the benefit of alternate and more innovative
insurance plans.35
In these instances, what triggered the Division’s actions wasn’t the
market share that these companies had lawfully obtained, but rather the
steps that they were taking to keep smaller competitors, who might have
offered better prices or more innovative products, out of the market.
Monopolists tend to grow comfortable with monopoly power, and when
they do, some find it easier to outmuscle rather than outcompete the
smaller competitor gunning for their business. Scrappy underdogs will
often enter a static, concentrated market by upending the business model
entirely—selling books online instead of through brick-and-mortar
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 243 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing the trial court’s
finding of fact on the issue).
28 See id. at 71.
29 See generally Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C., May 18,
1998), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/08/09/1763.pdf.
30 See generally Complaint, United States and State of Texas v. United Reg’l Health Care System,
No. 7:11-cv-00030 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/file/514171/download.
31 Id. at 2.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 18.
35 Id. at 19.
27
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stores, for example. Incumbents tend to dislike disruptive innovation,
because it has the potential to knock them out of their position at the top.
However, disruptive innovation is usually good for consumers, and that
is what we care about.
V. WITHOUT PENALIZING ICARUS
Earlier, I mentioned that understanding how we clear the way for
innovation would involve a discussion of what we as enforcers do as well
as an understanding of what antitrust does not do. Take the U.S. approach
to patents. Patents, once obtained, can confer a type of market (or
monopoly) power on the patent holder for the length of the exclusivity
period. We are okay with that, and allow patent holders to earn those
profits, because we want to reward the investment and the ingenuity that
goes into creating the patented invention and encourage the innovations
that can now be built on top of it. What we do not do is take away those
monopoly profits if earned lawfully. If a patent becomes more popular
than expected, we do not seize control of it. If a patent becomes more
useful than predicted, we do not mandate its licensing. If a patent
becomes commercially important, we do not impute F/RAND
commitments.
Staying in the patent world, our approach to the standard setting
process presents another example of where we foster innovation by
refraining from action. Standard setting involves a group of competitors
getting together and deciding upon a common technical standard
incorporating a patented technology,36 ending competition between
alternative technologies. Such patents become that much more valuable
after adopters are locked into the standard and cannot easily revise the
standard, or use an alternative standard. Naturally, this raises antitrust
concerns but, for the most part, we have not challenged standard setting
because this particular type of cooperative activity has a lot of
procompetitive benefits. It is oftentimes essential for the development of
entirely new technological ecosystems, such as the 802.11 standard for
Wi-Fi.
Where we do grow concerned is when holders of standards essential
patents seek to exploit their newfound market power by evading the
licensing commitments they voluntarily made and threaten to exclude
implementers in order to demand excessive royalties. The competitive
process suffers from this type of hold up and victimizes those who have,
in good faith, begun implementing the standard. Alternative technologies
See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, at 33–34, (Apr. 2007),
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.
36
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may no longer be available after the standard has been adopted and set.
Benefits that implementers of the standard may have been able to wrangle
through competition between technologies is lost once one is selected for
inclusion into a standard. Implementers may be effectively locked in.
There are long-term consequences as well. Companies that thought that
they could rely on the F/RAND licensing commitment may be less
willing to implement the standard, or future standards. Just the prospect
of such hold up can prevent or delay other products from coming to the
market—or, they arrive, but with fewer bells and whistles. For these
reasons, antitrust enforcers and competition advocates are addressing this
behavior where appropriate.
VI. ELIMINATING REGULATORY FRICTION ALSO CLEARS THE
PATH FOR INNOVATION
Enforcers and regulators can also keep the engine of innovation going
by being as transparent and predictable as possible. People do not become
entrepreneurs because they have a burning desire to interact with more
regulatory and oversight bodies—I am sure that is pretty low on their list.
People become entrepreneurs because they are trying to solve a problem;
or want to build things; or want to make something that people want to
use. For that reason, we have worked with the Federal Trade
Commission, as well as officials at the federal, state, and local levels, to
oppose unnecessary regulatory barriers to entrepreneurialism, including
state laws that require sellers of over-the-counter teeth-whitening
products to be licensed dentists37 or that require hospitals to obtain
certificates of need before expanding their provision of service.38 We also
work closely with our counterparts at other agencies, such as the Federal
Communications Commission and the Patent and Trademark Office, to
find ways of using our enforcement or regulatory powers to further our
common goal of unleashing competitive forces into the market.
Being as transparent as possible about our actions is another way that
we can help companies understand where they might run afoul of the
antitrust laws, so they can spend less time talking to their lawyers and
more time growing their businesses. For this reason, we are strongly
committed to open courtroom proceedings wherever possible. The public
has a right to be in the courtroom. The parties we sue will frequently err
See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108–09 (2015) (describing
a Federal Trade Commission challenge to such a law in North Carolina).
38 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION & U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE:
A
DOSE
OF
COMPETITION,
ch.
8,
at
3–6
(2004),
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/atr/improving-health-care-dose-competition-report-federal-tradecommission-and-department-justice.
37
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on the side of caution, and seek closed proceedings during litigation. We
absolutely respect their concern and do not wish to see truly confidential
information released in open court, but open courtrooms help promote
integrity and confidence in our judicial process, and we have an
obligation to protect that interest.
To the extent that we can, we try to work with parties to head off
potential antitrust violations. Companies, trade associations, and other
parties are welcome to follow the procedures outlined on our website to
formally request a review of a business practice that they are concerned
may violate the antitrust laws. Such business review letters require a
considerable investment of time and resources by both the Department
and the requesting parties, but it is something that we are happy to do to
help well-intentioned parties avoid inadvertently violating the law. Last
February, we issued a business review letter to the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), an organization that develops
standards in the electronics and communications sectors, regarding a
proposed update to its patent policy.39 Our letter helped the IEEE clarify
the scope of the licensing commitments made by participants in its
standard setting process, which in turn will facilitate licensing
negotiations and mitigate the risk of hold-up, giving implementers greater
confidence in using the IEEE’s standards for developing new products.
We also try to provide as much guidance as we can in the form of
guidelines, such as our Horizontal Merger Guidelines,40 and our
Intellectual Property Guidelines,41 both published jointly with the Federal
Trade Commission, and we periodically revise these guidelines to reflect
current enforcement practices.
In addition, we try to disseminate, where possible, insight into how
we arrive at the conclusions that we do on cases. We will on occasion
publish a closing statement explaining the rationale behind our decision.42
We also file Competitive Impact Statements in conjunction with
proposed Final Judgments that describe the events that gave rise to the
alleged violations, and how the proposed remedy resolves those concerns
Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust Division, to Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitnery LLP (Feb. 2, 2015),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/response-institute-electrical-and-electronics-engineersincorporated.
40 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf.
41 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING
OF
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
(1995),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf.
42 E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust
Division on its Decision to Close its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola
Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp.
(Feb. 13, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-s-antitrustdivision-its-decision-close-its-investigations.
39
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in the public’s favor.43 The public then has the opportunity to offer its
comments on our proposed Final Judgments for 60 days through the
Tunney Act, after which a judge, not the Department, must ultimately
decide whether the remedy we have proposed is in the public interest.44
VII. MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY TO GO AFTER BAD CONDUCT
At the same time, there is a limit as to how absolute we can be in our
guidance. We try to provide as much specificity as possible, but we
cannot provide 100% certainty. The facts matter.
Antitrust has been protecting the markets for over a century, but it
would be outdated if we still looked at markets the way we did in 1890
when the Sherman Act was passed. Going back to the example I started
with, if we were hidebound in our product market definitions, we would
end up analyzing the smartphone market as a combination of the
camcorder, CD player, and answering machine markets.
Sometimes, we review mergers in industries we know very well that
are pretty straightforward, and we can use the same analysis that we used
in a previous investigation. However, we are not constrained by a prior
playbook. Markets change. Every merger has unique facts, even if it is
just a function of occurring in the same market a year later. What we have
shown, and what you will see, is that we are not going to take a static
approach to how we look at markets.
Take a look at AT&T’s attempted acquisition of T-Mobile, abandoned
after the Division sued to block it and Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) Chairman Julius Genachowski circulated a draft
order at the FCC referring the transaction to a hearing.45 Traditionally,
we have examined the competitive impact of wireless mergers by looking
at a series of local markets,46 but each case is different, and each gives us
an opportunity to take a fresh look at the market. Unlike many of the
mergers we see in this industry, which involve one of the big national
providers acquiring a regional provider, this one involved two nationwide
wireless providers. What we saw, as we delved into the market structure,
43

E.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Competitive Impact Statement: U.S. et al. v. U.S. Airways
Group, Inc. and AMR Corporation (Nov. 12, 2013), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/competitive-impact-statement-219.
44 See Ben James, Senators say DOJ ignoring the Tunney Act, LAW 360 (Sept. 28, 2006,
12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/10947/senators-say-doj-is-ignoring-the-tunney-act
(explaining the requirements of the Tunney Act in more depth).
45 Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T Ends $39 Billion Bid for T-Mobile, DEALBOOK (Dec. 19,
2011, 4:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/att-withdraws-39-bid-for-t-mobile/.
46 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Competitive Impact Statement: U.S. v. AT&T Inc. and Dobson
Communications Corporation (Oct. 30, 2007) (explaining impact proposed merger would have
on certain geographic markets comprising part of a single state), available at
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/competitive-impact-statement-39.
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was an acquisition that not only had competitive effects in local markets,
but also on a nationwide basis. Regardless of where they were in the
United States, customers of the “big four” wireless providers47 tended to
experience very similar choices, because the competition among the four
providers was fundamentally national, not local, in nature. Moreover, the
elimination of T-Mobile from the market would have eliminated an
aggressive price competitor that had introduced a number of innovative
pricing plans and promoted a number of new devices in the marketplace.
The transaction would have been bad for consumers. We were swift to
block it—and we were right. Look at the innovation that a standalone TMobile has introduced into the wireless market since the merger was
abandoned. It spent billions improving the products it offers48 and
aggressively went after other carriers’ customers by eliminating 2-year
lock-in plans and offering to pay early termination fees for those who
switched to T-Mobile.49 Their competitors responded in kind. Sprint
began offering lower prices and alternative plans,50 and AT&T began
targeting T-Mobile customers with a $200 credit, plus money for
smartphone trade-ins, if they switched to AT&T.51
Then last year, there was Comcast’s proposed acquisition of Time
Warner Cable.52 Relying upon past precedent, a lot of people assumed
that we would evaluate the transaction based upon head-to-head
competition for subscribers in a series of local geographic markets, and
conclude that since the parties did not overlap geographically the
transaction posed no competitive concerns.53 However, the markets at
issue had evolved, something our analysis took into account. What
concerned us was the competitive threat created by the merged
company’s control over so much of the national market for content
distribution. New Comcast’s share of the high speed broadband market
47

AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile. See generally Scott Webster & Jessica Dolcourt, Before
You Switch Wireless Carriers, Read This, CNET (Feb. 3, 2016, 7:59 AM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/comparing-wireless-carrier-plans-us.
48 See T-Mobile, 2.3 Million New Customers Join the Un-carrier Revolution as the Company
Delivers 11% Service Revenue Growth and 42% Adjusted EBITDA Growth Year-Over-Year (Oct.
27, 2015), https://newsroom.t-mobile.com/media-kits/q3-2015-earnings.htm (detailing TMobile’s investment in expanding its 4G LTE network).
49
T-Mobile, Trapped by Contracts and Phone Payment Plans?, http://www.tmobile.com/offer/switch-carriers-no-early-termination-fee.html (last updated 2016).
50 See Kellex, Sprint’s “Biggest Wireless Offer in History” Slashes Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile
Plans by 50%, DROID LIFE (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.droid-life.com/2015/11/18/sprint-50deal-att-verizon-tmobile/.
51 See Todd Bishop, AT&T Confirms $200 ‘Switcher Credit’ for T-Mobile Customers, GEEKWIRE
(Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.geekwire.com/2014/att-confirms-200-switcher-credit-tmobilecustomers/.
52 Rupert Neate & Dominic Rushe, Comcast Announces $45.2bn Takeover of Time Warner Cable,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/feb/13/comcast-takeovertime-warner.
53 See supra text accompanying note 46.
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would have been nearly 60%, generating substantial leverage against
edge providers, including over-the-top video distributors, who need to
reach those customers.54 The merger would have placed Comcast in a
stronger position to frustrate the rise of online video competitors, who
provide new competitive alternatives to traditional cable service that
could become substitutes for Comcast’s video business. Ultimately, our
concerns—and the concerns of our colleagues at the FCC – led the parties
to abandon the transaction.55
VIII. CONCLUSION
We are always trying to nurture and promote competition, because the
fruits of competition are better products and services, and lower prices,
for consumers. When we look at conduct, what we are looking at is its
competitive effects, not the label it falls under. When market
circumstances change, we adjust our thinking based upon those changes,
and we remain reflective about that. It’s always worth asking ourselves,
is there something we’re missing?
Antitrust alone does not drive the innovation economy, but what it can
do, and where it excels, is to make it possible, at the ground level, for a
hard worker with a good idea to get her company launched and competing
on equal footing with the companies that have been at it for decades. If
you don’t believe me, ask the answering machine companies.
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CORPORATE INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 29, 2015, 5:17 PM EDT), http://blogs.wsj.com/corporateintelligence/2015/01/29/comcast-bulks-up-on-broadband.
55 Devika Krishna Kumar, Comcast Drops Time Warner Cable Bid After Antitrust Pressure,
REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2015, 6:25 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-comcasttimewarnercable-idUSKBN0NE2D220150424.
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